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The first essay of the thesis analyzes the productive efficiency of dairy farms
located across the rural-urban transition area of the Southern Indian city
of Bangalore. For that purpose a stochastic frontier analysis is conducted
on a primary data set comprising 418 dairy farms. This essay employs an
instrument-free approach to cope with unobserved characteristics that are
correlated with the observable inputs. The results reveal an overuse of high
protein content feed which may have critical implications for animal welfare
and sustained milk production.
The second essay extends the literature on the productivity effects of la-
bor market institutions by means of a semiparametric production function
approach to 191 European regions (NUTS-2) over the period from 1995 to
2008. Rather than focusing exclusively on one particular institution progress
is made by examining the effects of a whole set of labor market characteris-
tics. The results indicate that stronger presence of unions, higher firing costs
and more generous unemployment benefit payments tend to have detrimen-
tal marginal productivity effects, while hetergeneous findings on the effect
from higher union coverage depend on the degree of centralization of wage
bargaining processes.
The third essay applies the new translog gravity model by Novy (2013) to
investigate the heterogeneous effects of food standards on agricultural trade
flows. In contrast to existing works, this essay argues that standards affect
trade but even more so for countries that trade smaller volumes. The rea-
soning is simple but hopefully intuitive; bigger trading partners find it more
profitable to invest in meeting the costs of importer-specific standards. Con-
sistent with the predictions of the model, the results from the conventional
CES model support our argument. However, the crucial difference lies in the
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This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay applies a parametric
stochastic frontier (SF) approach with endogenous regressors introduced by
Tran and Tsionas (2015) to estimate milk production efficiency of Indian dairy
farms. The second essay extends the literature on the productivity effects of
labor market institutions by means of a semiparametric approach developed
by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Ackerberg et al. (2015) to a set of European
(NUTS-2) regions overtime. The third and final essay investigates on hetero-
geneous effects of food standards on agricultural trade using the structural
translog gravity model of Novy (2013) that incorporates predictions from the
heterogeneous firms’ literature.
In the applied parametric frontier literature it is commonly assumed that
inputs are exogenous or, in other words, determined independently from
the unit’s level of efficiency and other latent determinants unobserved by
the econometrician. However, exogeneity would require that information is
readily available to explain all variation in measured output in order to cor-
rectly specify the production function. Only in this rare circumstance one
may believe that Maximum-Likelihood estimation generates unbiased and
consistent estimates of all input coefficients. The absence of information on
inputs violates the exogeneity condition if this information correlates with
the inputs controlled in the production function, or, if variables associated
with managerial skill are neglected (Mundlak, 1961). Endogeneity of inputs
also arises if inputs in the production function are not independently chosen,
but determined by the characteristics of the farm(er) underlying efficiency
(Marschak and Andrews, 1944). This refers to the so called simultaneity bias.
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Another customary assumption refers to the mutual independence of be-
tween the error components, i.e. noise and efficiency. However, Pal and
Sengupta (1999) and Smith (2008) argue that there is neither statistical nor
economic rationale to assume orthogonality between noise and inefficiency
since weather shocks and seasonal fluctuations most likely affect farming de-
cisions. Error dependence may also arise due to unobserved inputs if simul-
taneity between inputs and inefficiency is present.
The first essay provides a parametric estimation of milk yield efficiencies
of Indian dairy farm households located in and around the Southern Indian
city of Bangalore. This essay relaxes the assumption of input exogeneity and
considers unobserved characteristics to be correlated with observed use of
concentrates without using instrumental variables.
The typical way to cope with endogeneity is to rely on instrumental vari-
ables. Valid instruments are required to be uncorrelated with the error term.
This requirement needs a strong theoretical backup and can in general not be
tested. Also, the composed error setting makes it particularly challenging to
rule out any direct effect of the instruments on the dependent variable or any
effect running through omitted variables absorbed either by the noise term
or by the inefficiency.
This essay employs a copula function to parametrize the joint behaviour
of the composed error and the observed inputs which gives the data the pos-
sibility to dispose of the exogeneity assumption. The approach used in this
essay is motivated by the experience that Indian dairy farmers’ capacity to
record quantities on forage production and consumption is limited. Econo-
metrically, the presence of latent major input factors such as forage decou-
ples the production process of milk from milk yield registration. Failure to
account for all inputs represents misspecification which causes a bias in the
remaining parameter estimates of the production function with further crit-
ical implications for efficiency scores in the realm of Stochastic Frontier (SF)
analysis. Further, major inputs such as forage can be expected to be related
to observed levels of concentrate feed since both are typically either comple-
ments or substitutes depending on the season. This causes the endogeneity
problem.
The results indicate that unobserved milk yields determinants are present
and affect technical efficiency levels, but not rankings. Accounting for those
latent effects the estimated milk yield elasticities with respect to high-protein
concentrate feed and labor become negative.
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The second essay foregoes the usual distributional assumption for ineffi-
ciency due to data aggregation. Here, regional production is represented by
the sum over all firm production within the region. Enforcing the customary
assumption of a half-normal distribution for instance results in meaningless
technical efficiency measures as the distribution of a sum of a one-sided in-
dependent and identically distributed random variable converges towards a
normal distribution according to the central limit theorem. As a result, effi-
ciency disappears into noise and findings on high efficiency levels from re-
gional data are spurious especially if the number of firms per region is high.1
A purely nonparametric approach such as the Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) dispenses with the requirement for an explicit functional form of the
production technology but at the cost of the assumption that all deviations
from the frontier are entirely attributed to inefficiency. Instead, this essay
maintains a parametric specification of the production function but chooses
a nonparametric representation of the inefficiency in the context of regionally
aggregated data. Output measured in value added is a function of capital,
labor and unobserved productivity. A productivity measure is backed out
from the residual to evaluate the impact of labor market institutions. The es-
timation exploits the panel data structure to cope for unobserved heterogene-
ity but relaxes the traditional fixed effect assumption. The so called control
function approach introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996) used in this essay in-
troduces flexibility by making unobserved heterogeneity a time-varying es-
timable function of observables. This applies some structure to the decision-
making process of the underlying firms.
The final results from the second stage of the estimation procedure indi-
cate that stronger presence of unions, higher firing costs and more generous
unemployment benefit payments tend to have detrimental marginal produc-
tivity effects, while the results on positive effects from higher union coverage
at lower levels of centralization of wage bargaining processes support effi-
ciency wage views.
The third essay is on trade. This essay revisits the “standards-as-barriers-
to-trade” debate using Novy’s (2013) somewhat more flexible translog spec-
ification to investigate the trade effects of public food standards. Public food
standards imposed by importing countries may be endogenous to bilateral
1See Brorsen and Kim (2013) on the discussion on data aggregation in stochastic frontier
models.
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trade volumes. The panel data used in this essay allows to control for time-
invariant factors such as distance, contiguity and language etc. in the es-
timation by including country-pair fixed effects. Potentially time-varying
omitted variables are parsimoniously controlled by importer- and exporter-
specific time-varying effects. Consistent with the predictions derived from
the more restrictive CES model, the results from the more flexible translog
specification support the argument that stricter standards are indeed trade-
restrictive. However, the estimated trade cost elasticity varies depending on
how intensively two countries trade, which means that for countries trading




Revisiting Dairy Farm Efficiency in
India:
The Case of Bangalore
Abstract
In this paper we analyze the productive efficiency of dairy farms across
the rural-urban intersect of the Southern Indian city of Bangalore. We con-
duct a stochastic frontier analysis on a primary data set comprising of 418
dairy farms spread along the transition area. We employ an instrument-free
approach to cope with unobserved milk yield determinants that are possibly
correlated with observed usage of concentrates, compound feed and labor.
Our results show that an increase in concentrate feed at the mean leads to
a considerable decline in milk yields. Conditional on the presence of latent
input factors, such as green and dry forage, our finding indicates an overuse
of high-protein feeds.
This chapter is a joint work with Rouven Schmidt.
Acknowledgements: We acknowledge comments from Alexander Silbersdorff.
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In Bangalore, a large dairy cooperative sector supports its members in the
provision of processed fodder such as concentrate feed, compound feed as
well as veterinary services, but has been unable to effectively address the
problem of deficient and imbalanced feeding (Pratap and Jha, 2005). Yield
gaps defined as the difference between feasible and de facto yields are also
more pronounced as imported breeds with higher milk yield capacities re-
quire higher caloric intakes than native breeds. This adds pressure to agri-
cultural production characterised by small-scale farming and affected by fre-
quent droughts to generate and coordinate sufficient amounts of green and
dry forage.
We make a contribution to the relatively sparse economic literature on
technical efficiency of Indian dairy production and apply the approach pro-
posed by Tran and Tsionas (2015) which extends the conventional likelihood
by the density of a copula function to extract the information on unobserved
milk yield determinants. Our application of their approach is motivated by
the experience that the Indian dairy farmers’ capacity to record quantities on
forage production and consumption is fairly limited.1 Therefore, the produc-
tion process of milk is disjoined from milk yield registration due to lacking
information on input factors. Forage represents a major input factor which
usually cannot be measured without a considerable amount of noise.2 Im-
portantly, high-protein feed has to be accompanied at any level by forage in
order to become effective in terms of milk yields. Econometrically, failure
to account for all inputs represents a misspecification which causes a bias in
the remaining parameter estimates of the production function with further
critical implications for efficiency scores in the realm of stochastic frontier
analysis. That is why we relax the exogeneity assumption of inputs and al-
low them to be correlated with the noise term containing the information on
unobserved inputs. Furthermore, this approach also deals with the possible
simultaneity between input choice and (in)efficiency. This is in stark contrast
to the existing literature that strictly poses the assumption that all inputs are
given, and can be controlled for.3
1This contrasts to Dikshit and Birthal (2010) who argue that household level surveys are
the only way to obtain reliable data on actual feed consumption.
2Forage in this particular region mainly consists of perennial grass, maize or crop
residues sourced on- or off-farm via in kind payments.
3To the best of our knowledge the TE literature on Indian dairy farming comprises the
work of Sharma et al. (2003), Saha and Jain (2004) and Rajendran and Mohanty (2005).
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In the applied agricultural literature, Ahmadzai (2017) uses the instru-
mental variable approach proposed by Karakaplan (2016) to cope for simul-
taneity between inefficiency and input choice. Yet, others (e.g. Wiboonpongse
et al., 2015; Nunti et al., 2019) opt for a copula approach to display a correla-
tion between the components of the composed error term consisting of ineffi-
ciency and the noise. Our work differs from those applications as we employ
a model that takes into account the correlation between observed inputs and
the composed error term as a whole. This approach is more general since we
do not have enough information on the source of the correlation (i.e. valid
instruments to cope for simultaneity between inputs and inefficiency and/or
dependence between error terms due to unobserved inputs).
We argue that major inputs such as forage are related to observed levels of
concentrate feed since both are typically interrelated either as complements
or substitutes. Sometimes it may be more profitable for dairy producers to
limit forage intake and feed concentrates more intensively.4 Drought gener-
ally requires producers to limit forage intake because of limited availability.
Our results indicate that unobserved determinants are present and affect
milk yields as well as farm-level efficiency levels. The preferred copula ap-
proach reveals that latent effects run through the use of observed inputs. In
particular, an increase in the use of concentrate feed leads to a decline in milk
yields at the margin with possible detrimental effects on animal welfare, and
thus future milking performance. However, our results also show that effi-
ciency distribution shifts towards the production frontier because latent milk
yield drivers are taken into account.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the data
set to be analyzed. Section 3 discusses the methodology. Results are then
presented in section 4. And, section 5 concludes.
2.2 Data
This present study relies on the information obtained from the sample of
418 dairy farm households collected in 2016/17 from the Southern Indian
region of Bangalore to estimate a common production frontier. Homogene-
ity of production technologies is imposed since all farm units in the sample
are members of the Karnataka Milk Federation (KMF). Cooperative mem-
bership ensures access to concentrate feed, compound feed, assistance for
4Forage is defined as plant materials for consumption by an animal and roughage refers
to a feedstuff with a higher fiber content. The terms are used interchangeably.
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animal breeding and veterinary services offered at subsidized rates. Milk is
gathered at collection centers run by the KMF in each of the 55 villages cov-
ered in this sample. Our primary data include information on output defined
as the total milk production per year in litres sold at collection centers and
corrected for household consumption. Labor is measured in full-man days
including family and hired labor. Differences in total milk production per
household are explained by the annual number of milching cows and vari-
able input quantities controlled by farmers, namely labor and the amount of
fodder. We used fodder composition tables to quantify each purchased item.
These are categorized as concentrate feed and compound feed measured in
kilogram. Reliable information on forage production and consumption are
unavailable, and thus taken into account by the econometric modelling ap-
proach. Herd compositions are considered as percentage shares of crossbred
cows, indigenous cows and buffaloes among herds. Crossbred cattle for in-
stance are genetically closer to the high-performing Holstein-Friesian cattle,
and determine the milk yield capacity of the household. Breed shares are
therefore considered as shifters of the production frontier. We also include
land, measured in acres of land used for the cultivation of fodder as a proxy
for forage production.
TABLE 1.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Milk yield (in ltr per per hh) 4140.89 766.865 51 4406
Herdsize (per hh) 3.25 1.216 1 8
Share of Crossbred (in percent per hh) 91 0.252 0 100
Share of Indigenous (in percent per hh) 8 0.247 0 100
Share of Buffaloes (in percent per hh) 1 0.058 0 100
Concentrates (in kg per hh) 633.75 331.357 0 1934
Compound feed (in kg per hh) 1683 1198.043 1 10 502
Labor (in full man-days per hh) 248.93 102.552 45.63 775.63
Land (in acres per hh) 2.34 2.303 0 9.83
2.3 Methodology
Closing yield gaps at the farm level represents an important task and an early
prerequisite of structural change. We therefore assess the status quo of pro-
duction potentials by using the parametric frontier approach (Aigner et al.,
4
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1977; Meeusen and van Den Broeck, 1977). In the developing country setting
where the probability of data being influenced by measurement errors is rel-
atively high, a parametric frontier approach with a composed error term is
more appropriate (Coelli et al., 1998). Parametric approaches to the measure-
ment of TE require the choice of a specific functional form for the production
technology. We assume a homogeneous Cobb-Douglas type production func-
tion written in the following form for the purpose of empirical estimation:5








βpxip + vi − ui, (2.1)
where yi denotes the milk yield of the i-th farm; the endogenous inputs
xip, with p = 1, 2, 3, comprise concentrate feed, compound feed and labour.
The exogeneous inputs zid, with d = 1, 2, represent land and herdsize held
by farm i. We consider levels of concentrate feed and compound feed as en-
dogenous inputs since these have to be accompanied by unobserved quanti-
ties of forage in order to become effective in terms of yields. Thus, we would
expect a strong correlation with the composed error term. We also assume la-
bor to be endogenous since effort is required to collect forages. The common
intercept α0 represents mean efficiency. To control for some unobserved het-
erogeneity related to geography and neighborhood ties we include a dummy,
γij, for each village, j = 1, ..., J = 55, in our regression. The parameters αd and
βp are the respective output elasticities to be estimated. Farm specific milk
yields are further determined by a symmetric random error, vi ∼ N(0, σ2v ),
with constant variance and a one-sided random term, ui ∼ N+(0, σ2u), as-
sociated with technical inefficiency. The composed error term is defined as
εi = vi − ui.
We utilize the information on observed inputs to account for output vari-
ation that stems from latent inputs according to:
xip = δwip + ηip. (2.2)
We impose the exclusion restriction for latent inputs, wip, which are assumed
to linearly affect xip. Endogeneity thus arises through cov(εi, ηip) 6= 0.
5We forego the flexible translog specification since the inclusion of square and interacted
terms of endogenous variables most likely introduces additional biases into the model.
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Pal and Sengupta (1999) and Smith (2008) argue that there is neither sta-
tistical nor economic rationale to assume orthogonality between noise and
inefficiency since weather shocks and seasonal fluctuations most likely affect
farming decisions. We argue for our cross-sectional data, that weather condi-
tions merely reflect a state that commonly affects all farm units. Dependence
may instead arise in this case from unobserved inputs chosen by the farmers
which is taken into account by the estimation procedure. Hence, we denote















u and λ =
σu
σv
. The functions φ(·) and Φ(·) denote the
probability density function and cumulative distribution function (cdf) of a
standard normal random variable, respectively.
The dependency of xip and εi is explicitly accounted for by the joint pdf of
xip and εi, f (xi1, xi2, xi3, εi) using a copula function. The concept of a copula
will be briefly introduced in the next section.
2.3.1 Copula Functions
The copula function used in the Tran and Tsionas (2015) specification is a
(P + 1)-dimensional distribution function with standard uniform margins:
C(F1(xi1), ..., FP(xiP), Fε(εi)) : [0, 1]P+1 → [0, 1].
Here Fp(xip) denotes the marginal cumulative distribution function of xid.
The cumulative distribution function of ε was introduced by Amsler et al.
(2019) and is denoted as:
Fε(εi ≤ κ) = Fε(κ) = 2T (
κ
σ




where T (·) is the Owen’s T function introduced by Owen (1956).6
A fundamental result of copula theory is Sklar’s theorem which describes
the role that copulas play in the relationship between multivariate distribu-
tion functions and their univariate margins. Sklar’s theorem shows that the
univariate margins and the multivariate dependence can be separated in a
such a way that the multivariate dependence structure is represented by the
6In the original model by Tran and Tsionas (2015), Fε(εi) is approximated by a numeric
integral of fε(εi). In this work, the analytical integral is used. Consequentially, the results
are more accurate and the estimation procedure converges faster.
6
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copula independently of the choice of the margins. Thus the joint cumulative
distribution function can be written using a copula and the marginal cdfs as:
F1,...,P,ε(xi1, ..., xiP, εi) = C(F1(xi1), ..., FP(xiP), Fε(εi)).
Differentiation leads to multivariate pdf of the form:





where c(·) denotes the pdf of the copula. Let ρ be a vector of parameters
of the copula called the dependence parameter which measures dependence
between the marginal cdfs. It is important to note that each of the array of
copula functions enforces certain characteristics regarding the modelled de-
pendence. For example, the independence copula enforces exogeneity on
all variables. Choosing this copula results in the standard SF model. The
Gaussian copula models linear dependence between each of the endogenous
variables and the composed error. The density of the Gaussian copula with
parameter correlation matrix Σ ∈ [−1, 1](P+1)×(P+1) to be estimated is de-
fined as:









Φ−1 (F1(xi1)) , . . . , Φ−1 (Fε(εi))
] }
where Φ−1(·) is the quantile function of the normal distribution and IP+1
denotes the identity matrix with dimension P + 1. To model the joint pdf,
the marginal pdfs are required. The marginal distribution of the data xip is








The rescaling factor 1/(n + 1) of the ecdf is chosen over 1/n, so that F̃np(t) <
1. Thus the domain of Xip is not bounded.7 The asymptotic distribution of
the ecdf with 1/(n + 1) and 1/n is the same, as both factors converge to 0.
With this information the joint cdf F1,...,P,ε(xi1, ..., xi3, εi) and pdf f1,...,P,ε(xi1, ..., xi3, εi)
7The denominator takes the value n + 1 to circumvent the fallacy that the minimum and
maximum value for one variable in our sample are representative for the population as a
whole.
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is specified. Consequently, the parameters can be estimated by Maximum-
Likelihood (ML).
2.3.2 Maximum-Likelihood Estimation
The parameters of the model are estimated via Maximum-Likelihood (ML)
estimation. Let θ = (β1, ..., βP, α1, ..., αD, λ, σ, Σ, γ1, ...γJ) be the vector of pa-




where Θ denotes the parameter space of θ. Under the Fisher regularity con-
ditions, the MLE can be shown to be consistent, asymptotically efficient and










where θ0 is the vector of true parameters and FI(θ0)) is the Fisher informa-
tion matrix.















The first term of the Likelihood function reflects the dependence structure
between endogenous variables and the composed error captured by a Gaus-
sian copula c(·). If there is no endogeneity, the joint pdf is the product of the
marginal pdfs and thus the likelihood collapses to the normal-half-normal
likelihood function under exogeneity.
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The marginal density fp(xip) is not a function of the set of parameters θ, and
thus reflects an additive constant. As a consequence the log-likelihood to be





log (c(F1(xi1), ..., FP(xiP), Fε(εi))) + log( fε(εi)).
The optimization is done by using the BFGS routine. The analytical gradients
of the log-likelihood are implemented to increase accuracy and speed, and
are provided in the Appendix. The algorithm converges after 20 iterations.
Using the Log-Likelihood obtained from the estimation procedure, we
can compute information criteria like the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).
These can be utilized to assess the quality of statistical models. We use the
AIC defined as AIC = −2 ∗ logL(θ) + 2 ∗ dim(θ), to choose between the stan-
dard SFM and the Gaussian copula SFM. The specification with the lower
AIC value qualifies to be the better performing model.
2.4 Empirical results
Table 2 reports ML estimates of the standard SFM under exogeneity in col-
umn (1) and estimates for the Gaussian copula SFM assuming endogeneity
for concentrate feed, compound feed and labor in column (2). Identifica-
tion requires the presence of at least one inefficient dairy farm (i.e. σu 6= 0)
irrespective of the distributions of endogeneous regressors. If σu = 0, the
distribution of the composed error follows a normal distribution and model
identification with only one symmetric error term would critically hinge on
the non-normality of endogenous variables (Park and Gupta, 2012). In other
words, due to the stable property of the normal distribution one could not as-
sign the variation to the error term or the distribution of the endogenous vari-
ables. To exclude the identification issue we test the hypothesis: H0 : σu = 0,
using the Kodde & Palm test. The significant parameter estimates for σu at
the 1% level signal the existence of inefficiency for both specifications. The
relatively high estimate for σu (0.860) also indicates that the model is correctly
identified (Tran and Tsionas, 2015). However, we soundly reject the standard
SFM in favour of the Gaussian copula SFM on the basis of the AIC. Accord-
ingly, the standard SFM under exogeneity would be most likely misspecified.
As a result imposing exogeneity under omitted inputs leads to overall lower
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levels of efficiency.8 The Spearman’s rho of 0.7 underlines a rather strong re-
lation in terms of ranks. The null of no dependency between the efficiency
estimates can be rejected at the one percent probability of error.
With regard to the parameter estimates of the production frontier, note
that scale elasticities cannot be identified if input factors are missing.
Monotonicity condition of the Cobb-Douglas specification requires the
partial production elasticities of the inputs to be non-negative; this holds true
for all estimates in the standard SFM under exogeneity which are mostly sig-
nifcant at the one percent level except for land and compound feed which are
insignificant. Herd size unsurprisingly shows the highest point estimates in
both specifications. Also, the elasticity estimate for an increase in herd size
conditional on breeds indicates that a higher share of crossbred animals rela-
tive to indigenous tends to increase the milk yield capacity and vice versa.
The coefficient for land is found to be significant in the Gaussian cop-
ula SFM. The insignificant estimate for land in the standard SFM might be
explained by underlying confounding factors.9 We would therefore assume
that the estimate obtained from the Gaussian copula SFM is "adjusted" for
all confounding factors. Even though land represents a fixed input factor the
amount land devoted to the production of fodder may still vary conditional
on farmers’ choice.
Again, as for land, omitted variables might confound the estimate for
compound feed. Weighting the likelihood by the copula function would take
into account omitted nutrient sources such as green fodder, silage etc. re-
quired for the animal to effectively digest compound and high-protein feed.
Interestingly, conditional on those latent inputs higher use of high-protein
concentrates significantly decreases milk yields. A ten percentage increase
in annual use of concentrates at the mean is associated with almost a five
percent decline in milk yields, whilst the standard SFM indicates a positive
impact. The sign reversal and the magnitude of the coefficient for concen-
trate may indicate that relationships with unobserved milk yield drivers are
more pronounced than with compound feed. The negative sign on concen-
trate feed may also reflect a seasonal effect since the survey was undertaken
throughout the dry season (i.e. from November 2016 to April 2017). During
this period farmers may opt for a higher use of concentrates due to limited
8The distributions of technical efficiency estimates from both models are provided in the
Appendix A1.1.
9Land quality may reflect a confounding factor which contaminates the estimate for land
in the standard SFM. However, we assume that the small size of the study area would limit
the variation of land quality.
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forage availability. However, excess protein bears the risk of high levels of
ammonia which can cause a toxic uterine environment leading to a reduction
in fertility and sustained low yields (e.g., Jordan et al., 1983; Laven and Drew,
1999).
Similarly, the Gaussian copula SFM exposes a significant and negative ef-
fect from higher labor, whilst the standard SFM indicates the reverse. A pos-
sible explanation for the negative sign might be that labor exists in surplus
because most dairy farmers rely entirely on family labor.
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TABLE 1.2: Maximum-Likelihood estimates of parameters
SF Copula




Herd size 0.636∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.012)














Mean TE 0.398 0.670
AIC 689.242 551.630
Observations 418 418
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, which were computed utilizing the estimated Hessian. ***, **, * denote
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The significance level was determined using the Likelihood-ratio
test for all parameters except σu. The Kodde & Palm test was used, to determine the significance of σu. The
dependent variables in Columns (1) and (2) were logged annual milk yields in liters. Village dummies were
included in both specifications and are not reported.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate a stochastic frontier with endogenous regressors
without using instrumental variables as suggested by Tran and Tsionas (2015)
to examine dairy farm efficiency in the Southern Indian region of Bangalore.
Dairy production in Bangalore provides an empirical motivation for the con-
sidered econometric set-up for which we find some indication for the pres-
ence of unobserved milk yield determinants. In particular, we utilize a cop-
ula function approach to drag out the information on output variation that is
either due to missing inputs or variables referring to managerial skills but are
correlated with levels of concentrate and compound feed use as well as labor.
Concentrates pose a natural candidate for endogeneity as its impact on milk
yields critically depends on the consumption of forage which is unobserved
by the econometrician. Hence, they are omitted variables in the production
function and the structural error is supposed to capture consumption dif-
ferences in forages. Unobserved farm-specific factors correlated with inputs
lead to efficiency levels that are on average higher than those obtained from
the exogenous frontier model. A comparison of parameter estimates of the
endogenous variables shows a substantial bias for those obtained from con-
ventional SFA under exogeneity. If unobserved milk yield drivers are preva-
lent, the exogenous effect from higher concentrate provision on milk is neg-
ative. This result may partially reflect a seasonal effect as the survey for the
primary data used in this study took place throughout the dry season. Farm-
ers may opt for a relatively higher use of concentrates during this period due
to limited forage availability. However, excess protein can cause rebreeding
problems leading to sustained low farm yields. We also find a negative effect
of higher labor input when latent effects are taken into account. Meanwhile,
in the absence of opportunities to attain reasonable estimates on forage pro-
duction and consumption the copula based approach may compensate for
the lack of the information. Verification of estimates from this method can
be partially expected if geo-referencing techniques can be combined with the
information from on-site plant samples to arrive at meaningful proxies for
the quantity of produced forage.
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2.6 Appendix























TABLE A1.1: The estimated correlation matrix Σ
Compound Feed Concentrate Feed Labor Composed Error
Compound Feed 1.000 0.511 0.123 0.347
Concentrate Feed 0.511 1.000 0.193 0.707
Labor 0.123 0.193 1.000 0.202
Composed Error 0.347 0.707 0.202 1.000
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FIGURE A1.2: Histogram of estimated residuals and QQ-Plot
from the copula SFM. The left figure shows the estimated den-
sity as a solid line. The dashed line is the kernel. The right
figure shows the QQ-Plot with 95% simultaneous confidence
bands.





























































































The first partial derivative of the Log-Likelihood function with respect to θ is
the score function. Let ηij, ηik ∈ {εi, λi, σi} and






































































and similiarly for all ξ ∈ θ \ {λ, σ, Σ}. For the matrix Σ the number of pa-
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For simplicity the index i is dropped from here on.
∂c(·)
∂ζ(P+1)













































































































































































This essay extends the literature on the productivity effects of country-
specific labor market institutions by means of a semiparametric production
function approach to 191 European regions (NUTS-2) over the period from
1995 to 2008. Rather than focusing exclusively on one particular institution
progress is made by examining the effects of a whole set of labor market char-
acteristics. The results indicate that stronger presence of unions, higher fir-
ing costs and more generous unemployment benefit payments tend to have
detrimental marginal productivity effects. Our findings on heterogeneous
productivity effects from higher bargaining coverage rates suggest that wage
bargaining systems play a key role in determining the direction of the effect.
For countries with higher degrees of centralization of wage bargaining an
increase in the coverage rate leads to a fall in regional productivity. While
higher coverage promotes regional productivity in countries with more de-
centralized bargaining systems.
This chapter is a joint work with Hannes Greve. The data set employed in this pa-
per was used previously for the master’s thesis of Oliver Ken Haase. Some introductory
parts and parts from the literature review of the master’ thesis were adopted for chapter
3.1 & chapter 3.2. The methodology has undergone a fundamental change and is consid-
erably more sophisticated in this work. The master’s thesis was also kindly uploaded to
turnitin.com by Professor Stan du Plessis from the Stellenbosch University.
Acknowledgements: We acknowledge comments from Helmut Herwartz and Xiaohua Yu.
Helmut Herwartz also kindly provided the data set for this work.
Author contributions: Haase O.K conceptualised the idea, carried out the analysis and
wrote the paper. Greve H. provided research guidance and revised the paper.
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3.1 Introduction
The economic literature refers to labor market institutions as a set of formal
rules which influence the interaction of supply and demand on labor markets
and, as a corollary, the price of labor that emerges from that interaction. The
conventional view is that labor market institutions are distortive and prevent
markets from optimal outcomes by raising the price of labor and reducing
the probability of dismissals impeding employment adjustments according
to firms’ requirements. Starting back in the 1980s, labor market institutions
have continuously been pointed out to be the factors behind the differences
in unemployment rates between the relatively more flexible labor markets
of the US and the UK, and the more regulated labor markets of continental
Europe (Nickell, 1997). The release of the OECD Jobs Study in 1994 man-
ifested the consensus that relatively higher unemployment in Europe is to
be seen as the consequence of generous unemployment benefits and strong
labor unions. Further impetus for more labor market flexibility was repre-
sented by the introduction of the currency union in 1999 which assigned la-
bor markets the macroeconomic role to ease off pressures from asymmetric
shocks by means of quick employment adjustments. Subsequent research on
this matter showed that stronger institutions prolong the adverse effects of
shocks on employment and largely determine the speed of economic adjust-
ments during the post-shock period (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). Recent
labor market reforms in Europe were intended to create a “good mix” be-
tween flexibility and job security through broadening of the scope for tempo-
rary employment contracts while maintaining strict employment protection
for permanent contracts. A number of studies have shown that labor mar-
ket reforms which introduce flexibility at the margin have only temporary
employment effects with potentially negative effects on productivity (Boeri
and Garibaldi, 2007; Angeles Diaz-Mayans and Sanchez, 2004; Dolado and
Stucchi, 2008).
So far less attention has been paid to the relation between institutions
and output performance and especially to the link between institutions and
productivity. Albeit this area has garnered some attention, theoretical pre-
dictions are as mixed as the empirical evidence. Our overriding interest is
in the proposition that labor market institutions affect regional productiv-
ity in Europe. For this purpose we apply a two-stage analysis. In the first
stage, the region-level production technology is estimated for which we cor-
rect for possible endogeneity due to unobserved productivity components.
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Controlling for time-invariant regional effects, annual common shocks and
spatial dependence, productivity effects of country-specific labor market in-
stitutions are indentified in the second stage. To our knowledge this essay is
the first to subject the effects of various labor market institutions on produc-
tivity to an empirical testing by means of a semiparametric estimation proce-
dure. For this purpose we employ a data set covering 191 regional economies
(NUTS-2) of 14 European countries over the period of 14 years (1995-2008).
We consider three sets of labor market institutions using four indicators of in-
stitutional forces in order to measure their impact on total factor productivity.
These indicators are union membership, collective bargaining coverage, the
OECD index of employment legislation and unemployment benefits ratios
representing the benefit systems.
One peculiarity among European economies is that a large share of em-
ployees find their compensation determined by collective bargaining agree-
ments independent of their union membership status (Layard et al., 2005).
Calmfors (1993) and Layard et al. (2005) argue that an increase in collective
bargaining coverage leads to a shift in the labor market towards more union-
ized jobs at the expense of non-unionized jobs in the long run. This will
likely entail both, an increase in wages and employment in the unionized
sector. Given the link between wages and productivity an increase in union
coverage may give regional productivity a boost if the unionized sector is
sufficiently large. Whereas a rise in union membership strengthens the bar-
gaining power of the union as a larger fraction of the work force is now able
to inflict damage on the employer via strike potentially harming productivity
(Calmfors, 1993).
Our results indicate that stronger presence of unions, stricter employ-
ment rules and more generous unemployment benefit payments tend to have
detrimental marginal effects on regional productivity. Further, our findings
on heterogeneous productivity effects from higher bargaining coverage rates
suggest that wage bargaining systems are important in determining the di-
rection of the effect. Countries with highly centralized wage bargaining sys-
tems (i.e. Austria, Denmark and Sweden) are negatively affected by an in-
crease in the share of the labor force covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments, whilst higher coverage in countries with more decentralized wage
setting schemes promotes regional productivity.
The remainder is organized as follows. The next section gives an overview
of the literature that links productivity to labor market institutions. Section
3 introduces the data and the methodology taken up in this essay. Section 4
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presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Institutions and productivity
Freeman and Medoff (1984) conclude that the overall productivity effect of
unions is positive. According to their conceptual framework unions’ pos-
itive effects are associated with the so called "collective voice and institu-
tional response face", whereas the negative effects are associated with the
"monopoly face" of unions. The collective voice and institutional response
view claims that unions give workers an opportunity to express their dis-
satisfaction over current workplace conditions which could otherwise only
be expressed through quitting (Hirschman, 1970). In order to avoid costly
lay-offs the management may respond through improved personnel policies
which manifest in higher worker motivation. More recent studies indicate
that unionised plants with more integrative workplace practices have signif-
icantly higher productivity than other similar non-unionised plants (Black
and Lynch, 2001; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Doucouliagos and Laroche,
2006). The monopoly face view argues that unions enforce higher wages
which tend to act as a tax on the returns on investment which limits firms’
spendings on R&D and tangible and intangible assets, thus hampering the
adoption of productivity enhancing technologies (Connolly et al., 1986; Hirsch
and Link, 1987; Link and Siegel, 2002; Lommerud et al., 2006; Menezes-Filho
and Van Reenen, 2003). However, unions’ wage gains may also tighten man-
agement control to minimise inefficiencies in production (Hirsch, 2003). Pro-
ductivity response from higher coverage rates may also depend on the de-
gree of centralization of wage bargaining (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988). Unions
are more inclined to internalize externalities, i.e. inflation and unemploy-
ment, caused by excessive wage claims if wage bargaining is centralized
(Holden and Raaum, 1991). Calmfors (1993) concludes that higher coverage
rates are expected to go along with larger wage increases in the unionised
sector under decentralized bargaining.
Institutions such as employment protection legislation refer to the de facto
rules of employment protection which affect firms’ ability to adjust labor de-
mand by imposing costs on dismissals (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990).1 Firms
may respond by choosing to retain unproductive workers instead of firing
them in order to circumvent the costs associated with dismissals (Brunello
1Samaniego (2006) shows that regulations are particularly binding in industries that op-
erate in environments characterised by rapid technological changes.
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et al., 2007; Di Pietro, 2002). Inefficient labor structures tend to be further
reinforced if adjustment costs induce firms to amplify market related labor
hoarding practices to maintain higher than required stocks of labor result-
ing in a reduction of hours worked and/or a reduction of work intensity
(Dietz et al., 2010). Firms may also respond to adjustment costs by substitut-
ing capital for labor which potentially raises productivity. However, Autor
et al. (2007) exploit the adoption of wrongful discharge protection by US state
courts to estimate the effect of dismissal costs on firms productivity. Their re-
sults show that the introduction of good faith exception indeed leads firms
to substitute capital for labor which raises labor productivity, but total factor
productivity declines. Strict dismissal rules could result in higher productiv-
ity in the advent of an expected long-term tenure. Workers are then incen-
tivised to increase effort or to acquire new skills and firms may be more in-
clined to provide training as it becomes quasi contractable (Belot et al., 2007;
Koeniger, 2005). However, this effect might be offset if employment protec-
tion is associated with a decreased risk of discharge and the lower threat of
dismissal might incentivise shirking or to be frequently absent.2
Passive labor market policies such as unemployment benefits first of all
reduce the opportunity costs of being unemployed, thereby raising reserva-
tion wages and inducing lower search effort (Brown and Koettl, 2015). Pro-
ductivity may be negatively affected if workers exert lower on-the-job ef-
fort due to the improved outside option given that monitoring is imperfect
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). Productivity may also decrease ex-ante, i.e. be-
fore the job has been chosen, if reduced job search results in fewer matches
between job-seekers and vacancies.
3.3 Data and estimation strategy
3.3.1 Country and region specific characteristics of European
labor markets
The analysis draws on annual data for the period 1995 to 2008 for 191 re-
gional economies of 14 European countries. The countries are Austria (at),
Belgium (be), Germany (de), Denmark (dk), Spain (es), Finland (fi), France
(fr), Greece (gr), Ireland (ie), Italy (it), Netherlands (nl), Portugal (pt), Sweden
2Ichino and Riphahn (2005) show that workers in the probation period are increasingly
absent as soon as they foresee to be transferred to permanent contracts covered by employ-
ment protection.
(se) and the United Kingdom (uk). Output is measured by real gross value
added. The information on employment and capital stocks aggregated across
all sectors is obtained from the European regional database of Cambridge
Econometrics which in turn draws upon the EUROSTAT Regio database and
official data from national providers.
We distinguish four factors that characterise country specific labor mar-
ket institutions. Corresponding information on labor market institutions are
the standard OECD indicators. Variables referring to two different aspects of
wage determination constitute union density or unionisation rate measured
by the share of union members from the labor force and collective bargain-
ing coverage measured by the share of the labor force covered by collective
agreements negotiated between unions and employers. The latter is obtained
from the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labor Studies. The index of em-
ployment protection legislation reflects the strictness of the de facto (i.e. the
formal and informal) job protection rules. The ratio of unemployment ben-
efits a worker receives relative to his last gross income represents the ben-
efit system. Region specific shares of employment across four sectors (i.e.
agriculture, construction, manufacturing, service) are considered in the first
stage of the estimation procedure to control for some of the heterogeneity of
regional technologies.
Panels of figure 1 display the spatial distribution of measures of the coun-
try specific institutional proxies. Denmark granted the largest benefits whereas
Greece had the least generous replacements (around 15%). Sweden shows
the highest union density with 83% of its labor force being union members.
Union membership is relatively high among Scandinavian countries as mem-
bership is a requirement for benefits eligibility. In Austria almost the entire
labor force’s compensation is collectively bargained while the costs involved
in dismissing individuals are the highest in Portugal.
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(d) OECD index of employment protection
3.3.2 Productivity
Before we examine correlations between labor market institutions and pro-
ductivity, we first estimate a production function and use the estimated pa-
rameters to recover region-specific and time-varying measures of productiv-
ity. We also control for regional sectoral allocation of labor by considering
these as shifters of the common production technology. Productivity shocks
observed by firms affect the accumulation of inputs within the regions and
lead to biased ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of input coefficients.
Thus, we maintain a parametric specification of the production function, but
choose a nonparametric representation of productivity to impose a structure
on the decision-making process of the underlying firms (Olley and Pakes,
1996). In this essay, we use the Ackerberg et al. (2015) (henceforth ACF) re-
finement of Olley and Pakes (1996) (henceforth OP). ACF suggest that the
OP approach most likely suffers from multicollinearity issues due to sepa-
rate identification of input parameters. A brief description of the approach is
provided in the Appendix.
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The production function to be estimated reads as:
yit = β0 + F(xit) + sharesitθ + ωit + ηit,
i = 1, ..., N; t = 1, ..., T. (3.1)
where N is the cross-section of regions operating over a fixed time dimension
T, yit is the mean scaled and logged output of the i-th region at time t. The
common intercept parameter β0 represents mean efficiency. A (2× 1) vector
of mean scaled and logged input quantities that consist of the regional stock
of capital and employment is denoted by xit. Due to the level of aggregation,
a Cobb–Douglas specification is often used which may involve the assump-
tion of constant returns to scale. We use the flexible translog specification
(Christensen, 1971) which allows returns to scale to vary at every point in the
sample. The technology is represented by F(xit) = xitδ + 12 x
′
itΨxit , where δ
is a (1× 2) vector of parameters and Ψ is a (2× 2) matrix of parameters to
be estimated. Furthermore, the (3× 1) vector sharesit accommodates sectoral
labor allocations with its parameters contained in the (1× 3) vector θ to be
estimated. Uninformative noise is captured by ηit, whereas ωit represents a
structural unobservable associated with productivity.
We produce two sets of estimates. For the first set, we estimate the pro-
duction function as in (1) to obtain output elasticities of inputs. For the sec-
ond, we estimate the input coefficients by OLS for the sake of comparison.
Table 1 displays parameter estimates for our translog specification of the pro-
duction function. As expected, all technology parameters are biased with
OLS if input choice is correlated with productivity shocks. With respect to
the functional form the translog specification including squared and crossed
terms yields consistent estimation results. Positive marginal returns with re-
spect to both input factors and negative coefficients for both squared terms
measured at the mean fulfill the monotonicity condition which requires a
production function to be monotonic and concave in input quantities. In ad-
dition, the positive estimate for the crossed term indicates a complementary
relation between capital and labor.
Total factor productivity of region i at time t can then be recovered as
residual according to
t f pit = yit − xitδ̂−
1
2
x′itΨ̂xit − sharesitθ̂. (3.2)
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TABLE 2.1: Output elasticities of the translog production function
OLS OP w/ ACF





Labor × Labor −.178∗∗∗ −.084∗∗∗
(.035) (.000)
Capital × Capital −.309∗∗∗ −.150∗∗∗
(.031) (.000)









Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Intercepts included but not reported. The dependent variable is gross value added.
TFP measures obtained from equation (2) may reflect differences in mark-
ups and the number of multiproduct firms within regions (Klette and Griliches,
1996; Katayama et al., 2009; De Loecker and Konings, 2006; De Loecker, 2011;
Van Beveren, 2012). With regional fixed effects in the next step, our estimates
control for cross-sectional differences in productivity that may be caused for
instance by differences in the number of firms or work ethics. Thereby we
consider exclusively within variations and not variations in the levels of in-
stitutional proxies.
3.3.3 Labor market institutions
For the second stage, we use total factor productivity obtained in (3.2) to
estimate the productivity effects of labor market characteristics using a fixed
effect spatial lag model (SAR model) to also account for regional externalities
(Kosfeld and Dreger, 2006). The second-stage model reads as:
t f pit = ρ ∑
j
wij t f pjt + αi + τt + zitγ + eit, (3.3)
3.4. Results 9
where t f pit is the logged total factor productivity estimate derived from the
first stage, αi captures time-invariant region-specific effects, and τt denotes
a common time effect. The variables of interest, i.e. proxies for labor mar-
ket characteristics, are comprised by the vector zit, where γ is the vector of
productivity parameters to be estimated. wij depicts the pattern of spatial
dependence based on the inverse distance between the centroids of region i
and region j. Spatial dependence is quantified by means of the spatial autore-
gressive parameter ρ restricted to be less than unity in absolute value. eit is a
normally distributed i.i.d. disturbance with constant variance. We estimate
the model with spatially autoregressive productivity and fixed effects using
the quasi–ML estimator derived by Lee and Yu (2010).
3.4 Results
Table 2 displays the parameter estimates for the institutional effects. We in-
clude unemployment benefit ratios and the index of employment protection
legislation among all specifications. Results indicate that more generous un-
employment benefits tend to negatively affect regional productivity. The
magnitude of the effects remains largely unchanged across specifications.
The coefficient on employment protection is significantly negative across all
specifications which supports the idea that firing costs act as a constraint on
the reallocation of labor towards more productive activities possibly reinforc-
ing the problem of quality and quantity mismatch.
In column (1) we control for collective bargaining coverage. The posi-
tive and significant coefficient on collective bargaining coverage may con-
firm Freeman and Medoff (1984)’s positive "voice effect" which precipitates
better workplace policies and improves communication channels between
management and employees. On the other hand, a positive productivity re-
sponse from higher collective bargaining coverage due to wage increases in
the unionised sector may also be supported by efficiency wage considera-
tions.
In column (2) we introduce union membership instead of collective bar-
gaining coverage. The exchange in the variable hardly affects the magnitude
of the other coefficients. The low and insignificant effect of higher union
density most likely reflects an omitted variable bias due to overlaps between
union membership and collective bargaining coverage.
TABLE 2.2: The effect of labor market institutions on regional productivity
Dependent variable: t f pit (1) (2) (3) (4)
Union membership rate −.004 −.032∗∗ −.035∗∗
(.013) (.015) (.015)
Coverage rate .077∗∗∗ .105∗∗∗ .123∗∗∗
(.024) (.027) (.027)
Coverage rate×centralization dummy −.663∗∗∗
(.147)
Unemployment benefits ratio −.022∗∗ −.022∗∗ −.022∗∗ −.022∗∗
(.009) (.008) (.009) (.009)
EPL index −.075∗∗∗ −.093∗∗∗ −.084∗∗∗ −.088∗∗∗
(.024) (.025) (.025) (.025)
Observations 2,674 2,674 2,674 2,674
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Intercepts included but not reported. All estimations include dummies for each region and year and take account
of spatial dependency.
Thus, we control for both covariates in column (3) to solve the likely is-
sue of confounding apparent in the first two specifications between collec-
tive bargaining and union density. The positive effect from higher bargain-
ing coverage increases in magnitude while the negative union density effect
becomes significant and also increases in magnitude. The negative and sig-
nificant estimate of the coefficient on union density may reveal the monopoly
face of unions impeding the introduction of possibly labor saving practices.
A different rationale for the negative effect might be that unions offer an ex-
clusive good, i.e. higher job security, which possibly attracts individuals with
lower employment probabilities. This self-selection scheme may represent an
additional underlying cause for the negative union effect on productivity.
In column (4) we check for possible heterogeneous effects from higher
coverage rates and interact the coverage rate with a dummy that takes the
value of one for countries with highly centralized wage bargaining systems
(i.e. Austria, Denmark and Sweden). For these, an increase in the cover-
age rate leads to a fall in regional productivity, whilst the reverse applies to
countries with more decentralized wage bargaining systems. This finding
may support the view that higher levels of centralization induce unions to
internalise externalities from excessive wage claims at the cost of lower pro-
ductivity across industries given the positive link between productivity and
wages.
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3.5 Concluding remarks
This essay subjects the question whether labor market institutions affect re-
gional productivity to an empirical investigation. Utilising European NUTS-
2 level data on 191 regions from 1995 to 2008, the effect of various institu-
tional proxies on regional production are estimated by controlling for en-
dogeneity according to Olley and Pakes (1996) & Ackerberg et al. (2015).
We cautiously conclude that our findings on the negative effects of higher
unionisation on regional productivity may point at Freeman and Medoff’s
monopoly face of unions due to excessive wage claims enforced by costly
lay-off threats and impediments to adopt new and possibly labor saving tech-
nologies. Heterogeneous effects from higher bargaining coverage on produc-
tivity could refer to the "voice effect" advocating for moderate wage increases
if bargaining is more centralized at the cost of lower productivity. The posi-
tive effect for more decentralized bargaining systems may support efficiency
wage views. Also, we would expect more workers with lower employment
probabilities among unions. Our findings on higher employment protection
confirm its role as an impediment to the maintenance of optimal labor stocks.
Higher unemployment benefits are linked to lower productivity which backs
up the idea that generous payments disincentivise job seeking effort or on the
job effort due to shifts in reservation wages.
Based on the idea that unions tend to arise in the wake of higher economic
activity we suggest that labor market policies should obviously be heteroge-
neous across regions conditional on regional productive performance. A one-
size-fits-all approach most likely hampers the potentially desired catching-
up process of low performing regions which could benefit from greater flexi-
bility. However, exogenous interventions to induce more flexibility may give
rise to higher union membership rates and strikes even though this relation-
ship is not scrutinized in our analysis.
In regard to future research, a refinement would need to include a more
nuanced measure for the degree of coordination since adverse productivity
effects from unions might be offset by highly coordinated forms of bargain-
ing (Nickell and Layard, 1999). Also, country specific measures on union
density and collective bargaining coverage conceal regional variation, thus
it would be desirable to extent the analysis based on region-level informa-
tion for those institutions. Regressing regional productivity on institutional
12
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Evidence from Regionally Aggregated Data
variables measured at the country level envokes an attenuation bias as cross-
country variation is used to approximate the "true" regional effect. As a corol-
lary the attenuation bias drives the magnitude of effects towards zero which
would imply that our findings are in fact more pronounced.
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3.6 Appendix
Following Olley and Pakes (1996) the evolution of productivity is defined as:
ωit := E(ωit|ωit−1) + ξit, (3.4)
where E(·) follows a first-order Markov process:
E(ωit|ωit−1, ωit−2, .., ωi1) = E(ωit|Ωit−1) = E(ωit|ωit−1),
where Ωit−1 represents the information set at period t − 1 that contains all
past realizations of productivity. The unanticipated shock component ξit is
independent of the productivity in t− 1. Therefore expectations about future
productivity depend only on the productivity in the previous period.
The fundamental idea of the Olley and Pakes (1996) approach to estimate
productivity is that unobserved productivity is a function f (·) of observables:
ωit = ft(kit, lit, Iit), (3.5)
where lit is the log of the labour input, kit is the log of the stock of capital
and Iit is the log of investment.
Labor is chosen sometime before t due to labor market institutions caus-
ing sluggish employment adjustments (Ackerberg et al., 2015). The stock of
capital is chosen in t − 1. Investments are made instantaneously in t and
expose the information on productivity.
By substituting (2.5) for ωit, the production function in (1) can be written
as:
yit = Φit(kit, lit, Iit) + ηit (3.6)
with
Φit = β0 + F(xit) + ft(·).
And, equation (2.6) is estimated in the first-stage using non-parametric tech-
niques for ft(·) which gives:
Φ̂it = β0 + F(xit) + ω̂it. (3.7)
Parameters for the stock of capital and labor input will be jointly identified
because of the inclusion of capital in ft(·) and collinearity between labour
and productivity (Ackerberg et al., 2015).3 The following moment conditions
for the estimation of productions function coefficients in the second stage
emerge from the assumptions underlying the evolution of productivity and







Note that both moment conditions hold if kit and lit are decided at any time
before t given E[ξit|Iit−b] = 0 and kit, lit ∈ Iit−b with b ∈ N.Iit−b is the
information set of firms in region i at t− b.
3Separate identification as in Olley and Pakes (1996) would refer to very specific data






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The heterogeneous effects of
standards
on agricultural trade flows
Abstract
This article uses a theory-founded translog gravity model to investigate the
heterogeneous effects of food standards on aggregate agricultural trade. We
revisit the “standards-as-barriers-to-trade” debate with a distinctive twist.
In contrast to existing works, we show that standards reduce trade but even
more so for countries that trade smaller volumes. Our identification strat-
egy exploits the within country variation in specific trade concerns. We con-
firm that stricter importer standards are indeed trade-restrictive. However,
the estimated trade cost elasticity varies depending on how intensively two
countries trade; specifically decreasing in magnitude with increasing import
share of the exporter in the importing country’s total imports. The reason
is simple but intuitive; bigger trading partners find it more profitable to in-
vest in meeting the costs of importer-specific standards. This work is novel
in showing that the standards-trade debate misses out on an important het-
erogeneity driven by existing import shares. Liberalising NTMs will favour
smaller trading partners more than well-established ones.
This chapter is a joint work with Dela-Dem Doe Fiankor.
Acknowledgements: We acknowledge comments from Florian Unger.
Author contributions: Fiankor D.-D.D conceptualised the idea, carried out the analysis and
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4.1 Introduction
“Food regulations in different countries are often conflicting and con-
tradictory. Legislation governing [. . . ] acceptable food standards often
varies widely from country to country. New legislation not based on sci-
entific knowledge is often introduced. [This] conflicting nature of food
regulations may be an obstacle to trade in foodstuffs between countries
(WHO, 1950; pg. 24)”
Custom tariffs and other traditional trade barriers have been negotiated down
to near-zero. Concurrently, we have seen a surge in standard-like non-tariff
measures (NTMs). So while it may look like countries are substituting tariff
protection for NTMs, such simple arguments ignore the potential consumer
or societal benefits that NTMs induce, e.g., reducing information asymmetry,
mitigating consumption risks and enhancing sustainability (Orefice, 2017;
Beverelli et al., 2019). However, NTMs can indeed also be protectionist, or
their associated costs may keep non-compliers out of global value chains. It
is often challenging to know if a particular regulation serves genuine pub-
lic interests or protectionist objectives because both motives are often com-
bined in a single measure (Swinnen, 2016). Theoretically, the direction of the
standards-trade effect is ambiguous. Thus, how standards affect trade and
welfare remain empirical questions. The result is the almost unending “stan-
dards as barriers or catalysts to trade” debate.
However, one thing is certain; public mandatory standards set by national
governments usually vary across countries and often tend to hinder agricul-
tural trade. They do this by increasing the cost of trading. As our open-
ing quote suggests, this knowledge is as old as the first meeting of the Joint
FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Nutrition in 1950. Recent empirical find-
ings, e.g., public standards decrease the probability of trade (Ferro et al., 2015;
Crivelli and Gröschl, 2016), and reduce both the value of trade conditional on
exports (Disdier et al., 2008; Fernandes et al., 2019; Curzi et al., 2020; Kinz-
ius et al., 2018) and the number of varieties traded (Fiankor et al., 2019), also
reveal that we have made little, if any progress, in addressing the negative
effects of this regulatory heterogeneity across countries.1 Using the case of
public mandatory food standards, we revisit this policy-relevant debate, but
with a distinctive twist. Existing studies on the standards-trade effect share
1On the other hand, by harmonising standards across countries, private voluntary stan-
dards established by retailers, e.g., GlobalGAP standards or the International Featured Stan-
dards, enhance trade (see, e.g., Ehrich and Mangelsdorf, 2018; Andersson, 2018; Fiankor
et al., 2020).
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one thing in common; they are estimated using gravity equations that impose
the limiting assumption that the elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs
is constant, e.g., in the classical Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) model,
the trade cost elasticity is 1− σ, where σ denotes the elasticity of substitu-
tion. This feature means that food standards have the same proportionate
effect on trade regardless of ex ante trade levels. For example, consider the
point estimate of −0.15 in Disdier et al. (2008). This means that for OECD
member states the introduction a new standard decreases imports by 14% re-
gardless of the origin of the product. Even if some studies go further to assess
the trade effects by income status of the exporting countries, they estimate a
uniform effect for the country groups. We challenge these “one-size-fits-all”
conclusions and instead show that the negative effect of standards on trade
flows decreases in magnitude with increasing import share of the exporter
in the importing country’s total imports. The reasoning is simple; bigger
trading partners find it more profitable to invest in meeting importer-specific
standards.
The main objective of our study is to examine the heterogeneous effects
of food standards on agricultural trade at the aggregate level. To test our hy-
pothesis, we combine theoretical predictions from the heterogeneous firms’
literature (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2008) with a theory-founded translog
gravity model Novy (2013) estimated at the country level. This is one of the
first applications of the translog gravity framework in the agricultural trade
literature.2 Our empirical analysis exploits data on the cross-country differ-
ences in Sanitary and PhytoSanitary (SPS) standards using a panel of aggre-
gate agricultural trade flows (HS01-HS24) between 66 importing and export-
ing countries over the period 1998 to 2017. Because we focus in this paper
on standards that are trade restrictive, our measure of standards is from the
specific trade concerns (STC) database. It records any concerns raised at the
WTO against an SPS standard introduced by an importing country. If an ex-
porter raises an STC on an SPS measure imposed by an importer, it is obvious
that the former considers that particular measure to be overly stringent or
even protectionist. This is particularly relevant for agricultural sector where
about 94% of STCs related to SPS measures apply (WTO, 2012). Our main
finding is that there is a significant heterogeneity underlying the “standards-
as-barriers” argument that goes beyond the developed-developing country
2In the international trade literature, the translog gravity model has been employed to
study the heterogeneity of the custom unions effect (Chen and Novy, 2018). In agricultural
trade, Meng et al. (2018) use the translog gravity model to assess China’s agricultural trade-
cost elasticity and to analyze its heterogeneity across different types of trading partners.
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story. Bilateral import shares matter and play an important role in moderat-
ing the trade effects of food standards. One policy implication is that NTM
liberalisation will favour smaller trading partners more than well-established
trading relationships.
We contribute three main novelties to the existing standards and trade lit-
erature. First, is to the empirical literature that assesses the standards-trade
effect using the gravity model (Disdier et al., 2008; Ferro et al., 2015; Crivelli
and Gröschl, 2016). Like many demand-side theoretical gravity equations,
the models estimated in this literature assume constant elasticity of substi-
tution (CES) expenditure functions (e.g., Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003).
This class of models limits the elasticity of trade to changes in standards to
be a constant. Another implication of the CES model is that some volume
of the product is purchased no matter how high the selling price. Hence, it
is not straight forward to justify zero trade observations, unless we assume
fixed costs of exporting on the supply side (e.g., Helpman et al., 2008). In this
paper, we overcome these limitations by using a much more flexible translog
functional form of the gravity model (Novy, 2013) that addresses the issue of
zero trade observations while also allowing for variable trade cost elasticities.
Armed with this new framework, we find empirical results consistent with
the predictions of our model that the negative effects of standards decrease
depending on how much two countries trade with each other. As a form of
sensitivity analysis, we show that even with a standard CES gravity equa-
tion, the negative trade effects of standards decrease with increasing trade
volumes. Extensions of our modelling approach allow us to show country-
pair specific estimates of the introduction of an SPS measure for which an
STC is raised. Our analysis is the first to present country-pair-specific effects
of imposing stricter food safety standards across a panel of bilateral trade re-
lations.3 Our contribution is important from both an analytical4 and a public
policy point of view; working with country-pair specific estimates of a trade
policy shock — instead of the usual average effect across all country-pairs —
will enhance evidence-based policy-making in the agricultural sector.
Second, our work is closely related to the literature on the heterogeneous
effects of standards across firms depending on their sizes. Much of this work
has been done at the firm level. Fontagné et al. (2015) show using a panel of
3Anders and Caswell (2009) provide estimates of the country-specific impacts of stricter
food safety standards across a panel of bilateral trade relations with the US as an importer.
4As James Anderson argues “more general translog treatments [of the gravity model]
are feasible and desirable” (Anderson, 2011; pg. 147).
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French exporting firms that restrictive SPS measures in the importing coun-
try decrease both the extensive and the intensive margin of trade, but these
negative effects are mitigated for larger firms. Fernandes et al. (2019) show
that smaller exporting firms are more affected in their market entry and exit
decisions by the relative stringency of destination standards than larger ex-
porters. Using data on Peruvian firms, Curzi et al. (2020) show that larger
firms are less affected by specific trade concerns. At the macro-level, few
studies have considered the heterogeneous effects of standards in terms of
export volume. The exceptions include Anders and Caswell (2009) who find
that regardless of development status, leading seafood exporters generally
experienced a positive HACCP effect, while most other smaller trading part-
ners faced a negative effect. Ehrich et al. (2017) apply a quantile regression
procedure within the gravity framework to show that maximum residue lim-
its impede bilateral trade of selected agricultural products between country
pairs with relatively low trade volumes but have positive trade effects at
the 90th decile. Our paper differs from this literature in three respects: (i)
we consider the whole agricultural sector, (ii) we define size as exporter-
specific market shares in an importing country, contrary to absolute trade
volumes regardless of destination as done in the existing literature (Anders
and Caswell, 2009; Fontagné et al., 2015; Ehrich et al., 2017; Fernandes et al.,
2019; Curzi et al., 2020) and (iii) our approach to modelling the heterogeneous
standards-trade effect at the country-level is consistent with the predictions
of the translog gravity framework but still yields results that are consistent
with the micro-data literature.
Our third contribution is to the literature that assesses the heterogene-
ity of the standards trade-effect across development status of the exporting
countries. These studies usually report bigger trade reducing effects for de-
veloping countries compared to developed countries. For example, consid-
ering OECD imports, Disdier et al. (2008) show that OECD exporters are not
significantly affected whiles exports of developing and least developed coun-
tries are reduced by SPS/TBT regulations. Similar conclusions are reached
for maximum residue limits (Xiong and Beghin, 2014; Ferro et al., 2015; Curzi
et al., 2018) and HACCP standards (Anders and Caswell, 2009). While for
groups, these findings may be correct, our country-pair specific estimations
show that the effects are not always larger for developing countries. In fact,
depending on bilateral import shares the trade effects may be smaller for de-
veloping countries relative to their developed country counterparts.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discussion of the
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translog gravity model and empirical framework. This is followed in Section
3 by a discussion of the data used in the analysis with a focus on specific
trade concerns. In Section 4, we discuss the results of our model estimates
and discuss our research findings. Section 6 concludes and offers policy im-
plications.
4.2 Empirical approach
To guide our empirical analysis, we estimate a theory-consistent structural
gravity model. The gravity model in economics was until relatively recently
disconnected from the rich family of economic theory (Anderson, 2011), but
can now be derived from several theoretical foundations, including the Ricar-
dian model (Eaton and Kortum, 2002), the CES/Armington demand frame-
work (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003), or models with heterogeneous
firms (Melitz, 2003; Chaney, 2008; Helpman et al., 2008). Inherent in these
classes of models is the limiting assumption that the elasticity of trade with
respect to trade costs is constant. For instance, the trade cost elasticity is fixed
at 1− σ in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), equal to the Pareto shape pa-
rameter, γ in Chaney (2008) or the Frechet shape parameter, θ in Eaton and
Kortum (2002). This feature means that in our specific case ceteris paribus,
the presence of a food standard or an increase in its stringency has the same
proportionate effect on bilateral trade regardless of existing trade levels.
Since our interest is to assess the heterogeneity of the standards-trade ef-
fect, we follow Novy (2013) and employ a flexible specification for our grav-
ity model to allow for variable trade effects from food standards. The esti-
mating equation is derived from a general equilibrium framework — which
features multiple countries that are endowed with an arbitrary number of
differentiated goods — where linear homogeneity and symmetry of param-
eters according to Feenstra (2003) is imposed on a translog type expenditure
function. Imposing market clearance and solving for general equilibrium re-
sults, the general structural translog gravity with exporter market share as


















where xij denotes the bilateral trade flows in 1000 USD from exporter i
to importer j, and yj is the gross annual imports by j. The two variables
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are in levels such that the dependent variable reflects i’s import share in the
total of j’s imports which depends on total production in the exporting coun-
try yi, normalised by global production, yw = ∑
J
j=1 yj. Import shares are
further linked to the inward multilateral resistance term, ln(Tj), which rep-
resents a weighted average of logarithmic trade costs over trading partners
of importer j. The number of goods produced and exported by country i, ni,
reflects a measure for the extensive margin and γ denotes the translog param-
eter. The bilateral costs of trading are captured in τij. At first glance, equation
(4.1) looks distinct from standard CES gravity equations (Eaton and Kortum,
2002; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003) since the dependent variable is mea-
sured as import shares in levels and not the log of trade. As a result, the
translog gravity relationship is not log-linear in trade costs, which implies a
variable trade cost elasticity. This property is what we exploit to study the
heterogeneity of the standards-trade effect. Nevertheless, on second glance,
equation (4.1), just like the traditional CES gravity equations relates bilateral
trade to bilateral trade costs and other country-specific variables.
As the first and the last term on the right-hand side of equation (4.1) is
invariant over the importing partner j, they can be parsimoniously captured
by an exporter’s fixed effect ψi. In the same vein, inward multilateral resis-
tance does not vary over the exporting partner i and thus can be captured by
an importer’s fixed effect λj. Accordingly, reformulating equation (4.1) and
dividing both sides of the equation by ni yields the estimating equation5
xij/yj
ni
= −γ ln τij + ψi + λj + eij. (4.2)
Following Chen and Novy (2018), we adapt the original specification in (4.2)
to specify our aggregate panel data model as follows:6
xijt/yjt
nit
= −γ β′wijt + ψit + λjt + αij + eijt. (4.3)
The dependent variable is import shares per good. Imports shares are set
5An alternative estimation strategy is to maintain nit on the right hand as a multiplicative
factor. We prefer to divide through equation (1) by nit so that all possible measurement errors
associated with nit are passed on to the left-hand side. This also allows us to estimate our
models with the usual country-time fixed effects as is standard in the gravity literature.
6Whiles the structural gravity model can be estimated at the product level (e.g., the
armignton CES model of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003)), the translog gravity model
is derived at the aggregate level. Sticking closely to the theoretical model of Novy (2013)
we estimate our translog gravity equations in this paper at the aggregate level. Deriving a
product-specific translog gravity model goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
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equal to zero when no imports in the respective destination-year are reported.7
We define the extensive margin nit as a time-varying count of HS2 digit
categories exported within the class of agricultural products, i.e., HS01 to
HS24.8 The costs of trading ln(τijt) = β′wijt are specified as a function of
different time-varying observable bilateral variables, namely specific trade
concerns (SPSijt), bilateral tariffs (Tari f fijt) and regional trade agreements
(RTAijt). Our variable of interest is SPSijt. It is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if an exporting country i raises or supports a specific trade con-
cern against an SPS measure than an importing country j maintains in year t.
As a result, our identification strategy exploits the bilateral variation across
pairwise observations between trade flows affected by the specific trade con-
cerns and trade flows that are not affected. To control for a range of poten-
tially omitted variables affecting bilateral trade, country-specific time vary-
ing fixed effects, ψit and λjt, are included. They capture the size terms (i.e.,
the total agricultural production in country i, and the total expenditure by
country j on foreign goods), and other country-specific (un)observables (e.g„
institutional quality, comparative advantages in agriculture and other uni-
lateral trade policy measures).9 They also control for multilateral resistance
terms which are necessary for proper specifications of the gravity model (An-
derson and Van Wincoop, 2003; Feenstra, 2004).
The panel structure of our dataset allows us to control for time-invariant
heterogeneity in equation (3) by including country pair time-invariant fixed
effects, αij. Since equation (3) is in principle a gravity equation, traditional
gravity variables such as distance, contiguity and language could be included
in the model in place of the country-pair fixed effects. However, the country-
pair fixed effects are better measures of bilateral trade costs than the standard
set of bilateral varying gravity variables (Egger and Nigai, 2015; Agnosteva
et al., 2019). Furthermore, public food standards imposed by the importing
countries may be endogenous to bilateral trade volumes. By including the
full set of three-way fixed effects in our analysis we reduce endogeneity con-
cerns to a large extent. Including αij also means we exploit fully the within
country variation in our control variables. eijt is the random error term,
7Depending on the countries’ reporting practices, this could signify that imports were of
negligible size and are therefore not reported. The reporting practices are controlled for by
using an appropriate fixed- effects structure in the empirical model.
8We also use other definitions of the extensive margins as a form of robustness check.
For example, the count of HS6 digit categories exported or defining the extensive margin
according to Hummels and Klenow (2005). These different definitions yield qualitatively
similar results.
9To deal with the high-dimensional fixed effects in our model specifications, we use the
user-written commands reghdfe and ppmlhdfe (Correia, 2016) in Stata.
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which we cluster at the country-pair level to account for heteroskedasticity.
We estimate equation (3) using ordinary least squares (OLS). Because the de-
pendent variable is measured as market shares in levels, the OLS translog
gravity model can deal with zero trade observations. Note that the elastici-
ties in the translog gravity model are not constant between bilateral country
pairs. The variable trade cost elasticity can be retraced by deriving equation









As we expect β1 > 0, the magnitude of the negative food standard effect on
trade flows is supposed to be larger for trade relations where the exporter
only governs a smaller market share in the destination market for agricul-
tural products.
4.3 Data
In many high-value markets, export success is now conditional on compli-
ance with NTMs as export competition has shifted from prices to quality
(Curzi et al., 2015). In agricultural markets SPS measures, such as food stan-
dards, are often the most important NTMs driven among other things by in-
creasing consumer awareness of food safety, shifting liability for food safety
from governments to retailers, and growing public concern for consumer
and environmental protection. Even though the Codex Alimentarius Com-
mission sets international standards, the WTO’s agreement on SPS measures
allows countries to set their own national standards that protect human, an-
imal, or plant health. To prevent the abuse of this provision for protectionist
intents, the national standards must be based on a scientific risk assessment,
not discriminatory toward countries with similar conditions, and are mini-
mally trade distorting. These principles are not always achieved in which
case standards can be abused for mercantilist trade policy objectives. SPS
measures are also the most frequently encountered NTM in agri-food trade
(Grant and Arita, 2017).
10For the derivation of the elasticity with respect to food standards we simply follow the




While we are broadly focused on SPS measures in the agricultural sector,
our identification strategy exploits specifically the time and country differ-
ences in specific trade concerns (STCs) raised against SPS measures main-
tained by an importing country. STCs are issues raised at the WTO by export-
ing countries affected by SPS standards, which they consider unjustified and
particularly restrictive (Olper, 2016). Raising an STC is a formal mechanism
by which a country can introduce a complaint against another country’s SPS
policies regulating imports. Standards may be barriers to trade, but can also
be measures for market creation. As a result, measures which form strong
barriers to trade and are motivated by protectionism—–rather than prevent-
ing legitimate health risks—–are likely to be raised as a concern by other
members at the WTO.11 Grant and Arita (2017) call this a ‘revealed concern’
approach. Likewise, we would expect legitimate measures to receive fewer
complaints. Hence, we can expect that measures that exporters consider as
overly restrictive will attract an STC. This nature of STCs makes them de facto
restrictive and thus appropriate to study the standards-trade effect if the fo-
cus, like in our case, is on the standards-as-barriers angle (see, also Fontagné
et al., 2015; Grant and Arita, 2017; Orefice, 2017; Beverelli et al., 2019; Curzi
et al., 2020). Furthermore, policy-makers may have little incentive to notify
their own SPS measures but all kinds of incentives to notify the unjustified
barriers of their partners (Grant and Arita, 2017).
The data we use on SPS STCs come from Ghodsi et al. (2017). The original
source of the data is the compilation of NTMs notified to the WTO, accessi-
ble via the Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP). The I-TIP provides
information compiled by the WTO on all trade policy measures. One major
limitation of this otherwise rich dataset is that it is not readily available in
a form necessary for econometric analysis or quantitative assessment. For
instance, the dataset does not follow a panel structure where NTMs are dis-
tinctly assigned to products according to product classifications such as the
11This idea that exporting countries raise STCS when NTMs imposed by an importer
becomes an effective trade barrier is motivated by the timing of some STCs raised at the
WTO. Orefice (2017) offers many such examples. For one, in 2003 the Chinese government
raised an STC complaining about an NTM imposed by the EU that restricted the imports of
natural honey from China as a food safety measure due to the presence of chloramphenicol,
a toxic antibiotic. The consumers’ protection aim of this NTM is clear, but its timing raises
eyebrows. This concern was raised in 2003, just before the EU enlargement towards the east
in 2004. Among the new EU Member States, Poland and Slovenia had in 2003 a high tariff
protection on Chinese honey (applied tariff on natural honey respectively 89% and 45%) –
to be necessarily reduced the year after the accession to the EU at 17.3% (EU tariff protection
on honey). Hence, using STCs allow us to sort through the host of SPS measures introduced
annually to identify those which likely constitute unjustified measures or significant trade
barrier, as opposed to justified measures which may be of little concern to exporters.
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(b) Number of new
STCs raised
Source: WTO I-TIP database, own graph
Harmonised System (HS) or the International Standard Industrial Classifi-
cation. This limitation is addressed in Ghodsi et al. (2017). They enhance
the value of the WTO I-TIP database for econometric analysis of NTMs by
imputing missing product codes at the HS 6-digit level. Since we treat the
agricultural sector as one unit, we aggregate this HS6 digit STCs to the coun-
try level. We limit our sample to only bilateral pairs where an STC was active
at least once over the length of the panel. This brings our sample to 66 im-
porting countries (including the EU15 as a group) and 66 exporting countries
over the period 1998 to 2017 with a maximum of 87,120 (66 × 66 × 20) ob-
servations. The list of countries in the sample are included in the appendix
(Table A3.1).
While tariff rates are not hard to find, data limitations make it difficult
to document general trends in the use of NTMs. For public standards, key
sources of data include efforts by international organisations (e.g., UNCTAD
TRAINS), non-governmental institutions, various forms of government no-
tification to the WTO or concerns raised through firm surveys. Using data
from the WTO’s I-TIP database, we see a clear increasing trend in the number
of SPS measures notified to the WTO and the number of countries issuing a
notification (Figure 3.1a). Consequently, we also see in Figure (3.1b) that year
in year out new specific trade concerns are raised on some of these notified
SPS measures. If we superimpose Figure 3.1 on a graph of average tariff rates
over similar time frames, it becomes clear that the rise in NTMs coincides
with a fall in tariffs. Due to the conceptual difficulty of converting NTMs
into their ad valorem equivalents, establishing a causal relationship between
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tariffs and NTMs has received limited attention in the literature. Empirical
evidence, though scarce, confirm both substitutionary and complementary
effects (Orefice, 2017; Beverelli et al., 2019). To account for this potential trade
policy substitution, we control for applied tariffs in our empirical analysis.
The other standard gravity variables are derived from different sources.
The bilateral trade data is taken from the Base pour l’Analyse du Commerce
International (BACI) database developed by the Centre d’Etudes Prospec-
tives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) which reports the bilateral
value of trade by product, origin and destination (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010).
The advantage of the BACI dataset over that in the UNCOMTRADE database
is that the former reconciles discrepancies in bilateral trade flows between
CIF import values and FOB export values. To allow us to focus on the agri-
cultural sector, we aggregate trade data from HS01 to HS24. Tariff data comes
from the World Integrated Trading System and data on regional trade agree-
ments is taken from De Sousa (2012). Summary statistics on our dependent
and control variables are reported in Table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
SPSijt dummy 0.149 0.356 87120
RTAijt dummy 0.205 0.403 87120
Tari f fijt (logs) 2.320 1.228 0 7.786 87120
Import shares (%) 1.515 4.369 0 84.618 87120
Extensive margin (nit) 23.803 0.904 15 24 87120
Trade value (m USD) 0.171 1.391 0 65.212 87120
4.4 Results and discussions
Our baseline empirical findings are presented in Table 3.2. Columns (1) –
(2) present results using the OLS estimator (equation 4.3). The number of
observations differ across the different estimations because in column (1) we
exclude zero trade shares but include them in column (2). The high R2 values
we obtain reflect the typical good fit of gravity models. Our control variables
and the time-varying country and time-invariant bilateral fixed effects ex-
plain about 93% of the variation is bilateral import shares per good. Given
our identification strategy, the estimated coefficient of the SPS dummy is to
be interpreted as the average change in annual bilateral imports caused by
12
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the introduction of at least one restrictive measure by the importing coun-
try.12 In column (1) and (2), the SPSijt coefficient is equal to −0.013. The
coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. As shown in
the lower part of Table 3.2, this corresponds to an estimate of −0.187 at the
mean value of import shares. This implies that on average, aggregate agri-
cultural exports from a country raising a specific trade concern fall by 17%
(i.e., [exp(−0.187)− 1]× 100) if at least one concern is raised against an SPS
measure implemented by the importer. This estimate is very close to the 14%
estimated in Disdier et al. (2008) for OECD imports.
What is new in our contribution is that we are able to show that these
average effects mask a substantial amount of heterogeneity across exporting
countries. This is the inherent advantage that our analysis has over existing
works. The lower part of Table 3.2 shows that the trade effect at the 30th
percentile of import shares is 99%. This reduces to 70% at the 50th percentile
















30th percentile −5.167 −5.060
50th percentile −1.194 −1.170
90th percentile −0.075 −0.073
R2 0.930 0.927
Observations 76,219 87,120
Notes: Robust country-pair-product clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%,
5% and 10% respectively. Importer-time, exporter-time, and importer-exporter fixed effects included in all regres-
sions. Intercepts included but not reported. Columns 2 excludes zero trade shares. The dependent variable are
import shares measured as the aggregate of agricultural trade, i.e., HS01 - HS24). Except for tariffs all explanatory
variables enter the regression as dummy variables.
12The percentage change in trade flows from a change in a dummy variable is computed
as exp(β̂− 1)× 100.
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and further down to 7% at the 90th percentile.13 This implies that for coun-
tries trading large volumes, standards have limited negative effects. This is
a conclusion that is overlooked in the existing literature since the estimated
CES gravity models yield estimates that are constant. To see the essence of
our contribution, we plot in Figure 3.2 the estimated trade cost elasticities
reported in columns (2) along with their 95% confidence intervals across per-
centiles of the trade share values. We observe that the estimated effects are
heterogeneous across import shares. At the 90th percentile of predicted im-
port shares, where imports are large, the standard-trade effect is relatively
small at near 0. However, as we move to lower percentiles (where import
shares are small), the estimated trade effects become larger. For comparison,
we also plot the constant elasticity from the traditional log-linear CES OLS
gravity model which yields an average effect of -0.313 in the same graph (see
Table A3.2 in the Appendix).14
An added advantage of the translog modelling framework is that it en-
ables us to retrieve country-pair specific estimates of a trade policy shock.
For example, consider the case of STCs raised or supported against SPS mea-
sures maintained by the EU15 in 2017—the last year of our panel. The EU has
a reputation for setting overly stringent standards and is the leading country
maintaining the most restrictive SPS trade measures for which concerns are
raised. Table 3.3 shows that the magnitude of the trade effect increases as
the import shares in the EU15 decreases. Underlying this significant hetero-
geneity in the estimated trade effects is the import shares of the exporting
countries in the gross imports of the importing country. For brevity, we leave
the full bilateral trade effects for each of the 20 years to the Appendix (see
Table A3.6).
Overall, the results are in-line with our expectations. Consistent with
much of the existing literature, we confirm that stricter importing country
standards are indeed trade-restrictive (Disdier et al., 2008; Fernandes et al.,
2019; Curzi et al., 2018; Kinzius et al., 2018). That is to mean that the stricter
an importing country standard, the less exports is observed to that country.
In line with Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2008) type models, a stringent
13The SPSijt estimates at the 10th and 20th percentiles are extremely large. The reason is
that the translog imposes a hyperbolic functional form on the way our elasticities of inter-
ested are computed (Chen and Novy, 2018). Because import shares at low percentiles are
very close to zero, the implied elasticities tend to become very large.
14Note that direct comparison of the estimates is not feasible, for one, because the de-
pendent variable in the translog model denotes shares whereas the standard gravity model
denotes volumes as the dependent variable. For another, the estimate obtained from the
translog model is not an elasticity as it is for the standard gravity framework.
14
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importing country standard induces a selection effect by raising fixed and
variable trade costs that discriminates against non-compliant producers. But
consistent with findings at the firm-level (Fontagné et al., 2016; Fernandes
et al., 2019; Curzi et al., 2020) we see that the negative effects are reducing
with importer size which we measure as import shares. At the country-level,
our findings are in line with Anders and Caswell (2009) who focus on the US
as an importer and Ehrich et al. (2017) who focus on maximum residue lim-
its. But there are also some notable differences. Anders and Caswell (2009)
find that for HACCP standards neither the “standards as barriers/catalyst”
hypothesis fits developing countries as a whole. Among developing coun-
tries increased standards act as a catalyst for larger, more established export-
ing countries and a barrier for smaller exporters. Ehrich et al. (2017) also
report positive effects at high deciles of the trade flow distribution and neg-
ative effects at lower deciles. We, on the other hand, find that for SPS STCs,
the standards-as-barriers effect prevails for all countries — developed and
developing — and trade volumes, but with magnitudes that are smaller for
more established trading partners who have high import shares regardless of
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TABLE 3.3: Country-pair specific estimates of the effects of EU-15 standards
in agricultural trade in 2017
Exporting country Trade value Import share Trade cost elasticity Income status
(m USD) (in %)
Fiji 107 0.027 −11.950 Low
Cuba 368 0.091 −2.896 Low
Tanzania 413 0.103 −3.090 Low
Senegal 459 0.114 −2.781 Low
Uruguay 663 0.164 −1.927 High
Israel 1033 0.256 −1.236 High
Egypt 1080 0.268 −1.183 Low
Phillipines 1416 0.351 −0.902 Low
Russia 1622 0.403 −0.787 High
Colombia 2236 0.555 −0.571 Low
Australia 2440 0.606 −0.524 High
Peru 2767 0.687 −0.462 Low
Thailand 3050 0.757 −0.419 Low
Ecuador 3115 0.773 −0.410 Low
South Africa 3752 0.931 −0.340 Low
Côte d’Ivoire 4215 1.046 −0.303 Low
India 4755 1.180 −0.269 Low
Indonesia 5198 1.290 −0.246 Low
Argentina 5881 1.460 −0.217 Low
China 7467 1.853 −0.171 Low
Brazil 12600 3.126 −0.101 Low
USA 12800 3.184 −0.100 High
Notes: Estimates are based on exporting countries that raised or supported a Specific Trade Concern maintained against
the EU-15 in 2017. Also note that import shares do not add up to 100% as shares are given by the exporter country’s
market share per good in the importing country. Here we kept the importer (EU-15) fixed and show the variation in
shares across export partners.
their development status.15 Another implication of our results is that while
the standards effect on trade is mainly discussed from a North-South per-
spective — with countries in the South finding it more difficult to comply
— these generalisations may not necessarily be the whole story. Even in de-
veloping countries some producers will make the effort to meet importing-
country specific standards if those firms command a relatively large market
share in that importing country. For example, in Table 2 we see that develop-
ing countries such as Indonesia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Thailand and Peru
15The fact that our conclusions on the standards-trade effect differs from Anders and
Caswell (2009) and Ehrich et al. (2017) is not surprising and may just offer insights into some
underlying mechanisms driving our results. These two studies focus on specific standards
(HACCP and maximum residue limits) that may not necessarily be trade restrictive. Even
if their stringency levels change intermittently, producers may suffer in the short term until
they adjust completely to the standard and can then increase trade volumes. This is not
necessarily the case for the broad SPS measures we focus on, and especially regarding the
fact that we select out overly stringent measures.
16
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are relatively less affected by stringent standards in the EU-15 than devel-
oped countries such as Australia, Russia, Israel and Uruguay.
So why may standards affect smaller trading partners more than larger
ones? Standards impose both fixed costs, (e.g., investing in new produc-
tion techniques or adjustments to existing ones) and variable trade costs
(e.g., costly inputs, recurrent costs of quality control, and product testing)
for producers. The fixed cost component of a standard will affect mainly the
extensive margin as increased production costs induce market exit for non-
compliant firms, while the effect on the intensive margins is a priori unde-
termined. Standards increase production costs and may reduce export vol-
umes but the extra costs may be compensated by increased market access
due to quality upgrading and/or more consumer information. It is intuitive
to assume that for more established trading relationships, exporters would
have already invested in meeting the fixed costs imposed by the importer.
For smaller trading partners the fixed cost component is very high and thus
affects to a large degree their trade flows to the country maintaining the stan-
dard. It is also possible that bilateral relationships with higher import shares
will imply that the particular exporter involved in that trading relationship
has a lot of importer-specific experience. This is consistent with Grant et al.
(2015) who show that the negative effects of SPS standards diminishes as
U.S. exporters accumulate treatment experience. The underlying mechanism
is consistent with a “learning-by-doing” framework whereby bilateral trad-
ing relationships with higher trade volumes are are able to treat shipments
more efficiently as their cumulative experience grows (Grant et al., 2015).
Regarding the other control variables, bilateral tariffs and regional trade
agreements have the expected negative and positive effects on bilateral trade
flows, respectively. By nature tariffs and SPS measures cannot be compared
directly. Whilst tariffs are by nature trade reducing, NTMs can be measures
for market creation. So, even though our results show that tariffs and stan-
dards have qualitatively similar effects on trade flows, these two trade policy
instruments may affect market structure differently. For instance, standards
unlike tariffs affect both domestic producers and foreign exporting firms.
As a result standards displace smaller firms—both domestic and foreign—
in favour of larger firms (Asprilla et al., 2019). The estimated coefficient for
the RTA dummy is positive. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction
that trade preferences enhance trade flows. However, the estimated effects
are not statistically significant. This is because the extensive fixed effects in
our model specifications absorb most of the variations in the RTA variable.
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Not controlling for bilateral fixed effects yields a statistically significant RTA
effect. It is possible that these other control variables also affect agricultural
trade in a heterogeneous fashion. However, these go beyond the scope of
our paper. We refer the interested reader to Novy (2013) for the tariff case
and Chen and Novy (2018) for trade agreements.
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
4.5.1 CES gravity model with heterogeneous SPS effects on
trade
One concern with our findings is whether the results are model driven. To
refute this argument we estimate a CES gravity model with the exporter’s
market share per good in importing country j as the dependent variable us-
ing PPML and incorporate heterogeneous effects of SPS measures.16 Our
baseline regression in the translog framework is estimated using OLS. This
is because the dependent variables are in levels and so our regressions retain
zero trade shares. This is not the case for the CES model which will require
that we log transform the dependent variable. As a result, in this part of
the analysis we employ the non-linear Poisson-pseudo maximum likelihood
(PPML) estimator (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) which has become the
gold standard in the CES gravity model. This estimator’s loglinear objective
function allows us to specify our estimation equation in its multiplicative





− β′wijt + ψit + λjt + αij
]
+ eijt (4.5)
For that purpose of accounting for heterogeneous standards-trade effects,
we include the interaction between our variable of interest and quartiles
of predicted market shares per good into equation (4.5). If the trade effect
of standards falls with higher exporter’s market share as predicted by the
translog gravity model, we would expect the trade effect to be declining but
pronounced for the lowest quartile of predicted market shares. We use pre-
dictions according to Novy (2013) to circumvent simultaneity between the
16Unlike the translog gravity model, the CES gravity equation estimated using PPML is
log-linear in trade costs. Since variations of the extensive margin nit and the importer size
term (i.e., total imports or GDP) yjt of the dependent variable are absorbed by the exporter-
year and importer-year fixed effects the remaining variation in market shares is derived from
trade volumes between i and j. Therefore we effectively regress trade volumes in logs.
18
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SPSijt × predicted shares (First interval) −3.470∗∗∗
(0.145)
SPSijt × predicted shares (Second interval) −1.174∗∗∗
(0.066)
SPSijt × predicted shares (Third interval) −0.471∗∗∗
(0.045)
SPSijt × predicted shares (Fourth interval) −0.028
(0.026)





Notes: Robust country-pair-product clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% respectively. Importer-time, exporter-time, and importer-exporter fixed effects included in all regressions.
Intercepts included but not reported. The dependent variables are observed trade values. All models are estimated
using PPML. The dummy for predicted shares is omitted due to perfect collinearity with the importer-time fixed
effects.
dependent variable and the standards effects. The estimation equation for
quartile regressions in which the standards-trade effect is estimated for each









Quartile dummies Dint enter the estimation as indicators interacted with
SPSijt to obtain the corresponding heterogeneous coefficients δint across quar-
tiles and also as quartile fixed effects. The first term on the right-hand side
includes a (1× 3) vector r which selects out bilateral tariffs and regional trade
agreements from the initial trade cost vector wijt.
The results are presented in Table 3.4. In column (1) we estimate the
homogeneous effect of standards on agricultural trade. The coefficient of
−0.051 implies that an increase or introduction of standards are associated
with a decrease in bilateral trade of 5 percent on average. Because the CES
utility function is homothetic, the presence of a specific trade concern will
yield a proportional decrease in trade, all else being equal. Interestingly, the
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standard effect is larger than the tariff and RTA effect in terms of its magni-
tude with the estimates for latter two being even insignificant. In column (2)
we show the estimated standards effects for each quartile of predicted mar-
ket share per good. The first quartile refers to the interval with the lowest
import shares. As expected, the standards coefficient is largest (−3.470) in
magnitude for the first quartile and continues to fall with higher quartiles.
Consistent with the predictions from the translog gravity framework, the es-
timated negative trade effect of stricter importing country food standards
varies depending on how intensively two countries trade.
4.5.2 Further robustness checks
In this section we conduct further checks to confirm the robustness of our
findings. Our baseline models use contemporaneous values of our SPS vari-
ables. However, it is also possible that NTMs are implemented in reaction to
a sudden increase in imports from a particular exporter. STCs may also target
new SPS measures which are to come into force in the near future. As a con-
sequence, Crivelli and Gröschl (2016) and Fontagné et al. (2015) argue that a
contemporary SPS measure inadequately captures the “true” variation and
use the first lag of the variable on SPS to circumvent the attenuation bias. As
a first check of the robustness of our baseline findings, we use the one year
lag of SPS. Doing this further bolster our estimations against the potential
problem of reverse causality between import shares and SPS measures. The
results are presented in Table 3.5. Our main findings remain qualitatively
the same and the magnitudes differ only slightly. In column (1), the lagged
SPS coefficient, SPSijt−1 is equal to −0.012. As shown in the lower part of the
table, this corresponds to an estimate of −0.165 at the mean value of import
shares. This implies that on average, aggregate agricultural imports from a
country raising a specific trade concern fall by 15% if at least one SPS is im-
plemented by the importer. This implies a 2 percentage point decrease from
using the contemporaneous SPS measure in Table 3.2. If there would be an at-
tenuation bias then our estimate for SPSijt−1 should be in fact larger in terms
of magnitude.
Our baseline sample includes only bilateral pairs that raise or maintain
an SPS STC at least once over the length of the panel. SPS measures are
unilateral — i.e., if an importer introducing a standard it affects all other
exporters — but STCs are bilateral. As argued by Beverelli et al. (2019), an
exporter may not complain about a measure simply because the importer’s
20
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30th percentile −4.563 −4.385
50th percentile −1.055 −1.014
90th percentile −0.066 −0.063
Observations 72,859 82,764
Notes: Robust country-pair-product clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%,
5% and 10% respectively. Importer-time, exporter-time, and importer-exporter fixed effects included in all regres-
sions. Intercepts included but not reported. The dependent variables are import shares. Columns 2 excludes zero
trade shares.
market is irrelevant. In this case we would not observe an STC, although
the importer may have a trade restrictive measure in place. As a result, we
expand our data sample to include trade between all exporting countries and
all importing countries regardless of whether they raised a concern over the
length of our panel. As a result, the sample here is bilateral trade between 159
exporting countries (including the EU 15) and 92 importing countries. The
results presented in Table A3.3 of the appendix supports our main findings.
The reduced sample is not driving our results.
We have so far captured the presence of an STC as a dichotomous vari-
able. Keeping in mind the limitations of using the counts of STCs present,
we test our findings using the counts of cumulative STCs in place in year t.
Here the interpretation of our SPS variable of interest changes to the average
change in imports following the implementation of one additional protec-
tionist policy. Our main conclusions remain unchanged. See Table A3.4 of
the appendix. Finally, our translog models control adequately for zeroes.
However, to see how robust our specification is to other estimators, we em-
ploy the PPML within the translog gravity framework. Our main findings




How standards affect agricultural trade has been a subject of intense scrutiny.
The rapid increase in the number of published studies assessing the standards-
trade nexus — from about 14 in the year 2000 to about 140 studies in 2017
(Santeramo and Lamonaca, 2019) — is a good case in point. A limitation
of this strand of literature is that the existing estimates are all from gravity
models that impose the limited assumption that the estimated trade effect
is a constant. These lead to one-size fits all type of conclusions, which this
paper challenges.
In this paper, we provide the first set of empirical evidence on the hetero-
geneous effects of standards on agricultural trade considering import shares.
Consistent with existing research, we confirm that stricter standards are in-
deed trade restrictive. However, unlike existing works, we show that the es-
timated trade cost elasticity varies depending on how intensively two coun-
tries trade. This means that for countries trading large volumes, standards
have only limited negative effects. Thus, standards-related trade costs have
heterogeneous trade-reducing effects. Our finding that there is a significant
heterogeneity underlying the simple “standards-as-barriers” argument —
that goes beyond the typical developed-developing country-specific effects
— has far-reaching policy implications. This is important from a public pol-
icy point of view; for one, working with country-pair specific estimates of a
trade policy shock — instead of the usual average effect across country-pairs
— will enhance evidence-based policy-making. Even more important is that
smaller trading partners will benefit more from further NTM liberalisation
or harmonisation of standards.
Our work is not without its limitations. By focusing on SPS measures
which cover a broad range of policy instruments we provide general results
on the effects of standards in the agricultural sector. However, we do not
provide precise estimates on the effects of a specific standard on trade, e.g.,
maximum residue limits. We also provide results that refer to the general
agricultural sector and do not provide product-specific findings. To better
understand the mechanisms driving our results, extensions of our analysis
should consider specific standards, specific products. Further analysis could
also focus on firm level transactions and customs data. Furthermore, our
measure of standards measure the prevalence of standards, but not their
stringency. This makes it difficult to compare the stringency of standards
between countries. Further studies could employ continuous measures of
22
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relative stringency set on specific products, e.g., maximum residue limits,
to compare differences in country-pair specific standards. And finally, ex-
tensions of our analysis should consider applications of the translog gravity
model at the product-level or using firm-level data. The former will allow us
to understand if the observed heterogeneity exist even at the product level.
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4.7 Appendix
Deriving the translog gravity model following Novy (2013)
The translog type expenditure function is defined as:














, where m, k indexes the goods. The α parameters depict the preference
weights for country m-th goods, and the γmk parameters indicate substi-
tutability between goods m and k.








γmk = 0, γmk = γkm∀m, k = 1, ..., N























, where smj is the share of country m’s goods in country j’s gdp (yj) and
xmj is the nominal trade value of country j’s imports of good m.

















The destination price pmj = τmj pm is the price of good m in importing
country j, where pm denotes the net price for good m and τmj > 1, ∀m 6= j,
otherwise τjj = 1, reflects the icerberg type of costs of trading.
Imposing market clearance and substituting yields
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Define aggregate global expenditure on agricultural goods as yglobal =

























Following Novy (2013) the first summation index on the right-hand side
is changed from j to s to consider multilateral resistance. Net prices are sub-





































































































































































Multiplying out the last term on the RHS and letting the running index













































and assumes that trade costs to country j are the same for all goods from
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TABLE A3.1: List of importing and exporting countries
Importers
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Bahrain, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, EU-15, Gabon, Ger-
many, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan,
Jordan, South Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russian Federa-
tion, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Suri-
name, Switzerland-Liechtenstein, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago Turkey,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Viet Nam
Exporters
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Nor-
way, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rus-
sian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland-Liechtenstein, Taiwan, Tan-
zania, Thailand, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Viet Nam
28
Chapter 4. The heterogeneous effects of standards
on agricultural trade flows
TABLE A3.2: The effect of standards on agricultural trade: standard gravity model
using OLS









Notes: Robust country-pair-product clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% respectively. Importer-product-time, exporter-product-time, and importer-exporter fixed effects included
in all regressions. Intercepts included but not reported. The dependent variables in Columns (1) and (2) are dum-
mies defined for the probability of trading and exit respectively and are estimated using a linear probability model.
TABLE A3.3: Translog gravity model: Bilateral trade between all exporting and im-
porting countries








Importer-time FE Yes Yes
Exporter-time FE Yes Yes
Exporter-Importer FE Yes Yes
Observations 177,426 292,560
Notes: Robust country-pair-product clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% respectively. Importer-time, exporter-time, and importer-exporter fixed effects included in all regressions.
The dependent variables are import shares. Columns 2 excludes zero trade shares.
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TABLE A3.4: Translog gravity model: count of specific trade concerns
Dependent variable (xijt/yjt) > 0 xijt/yjt
(1) (2)
Log SPSijt −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)




Importer-time FE Yes Yes
Exporter-time FE Yes Yes
Exporter-Importer FE Yes Yes
Observations 76,219 87,120
Notes: Robust country-pair-product clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% respectively. Importer-time, exporter-time, and importer-exporter fixed effects included in all regressions.
The dependent variables are import shares. Columns 2 excludes zero trade shares.
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30th percentile −65.836 −70.213
50th percentile 15.224 −16.236
90th percentile −0.952 −1.016
Importer-time FE Yes Yes
Exporter-time FE Yes Yes
Exporter-Importer FE Yes Yes
Observations 76,219 85,200
Notes: Robust country-pair-product clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%,
5% and 10% respectively. Intercepts included but not reported. Columns 2 excludes zero trade shares. The depen-
dent variable are import shares measured as the aggregate of agricultural trade, i.e., HS01 - HS24). Except for tariffs
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